

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00164 01 OF 02 090915Z

11

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 050600

R 090817Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0938

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0164

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: CODEL HUMPHREY/HOLLINGS

DISCUSSIONS WITH US, SOVIET, FRG AND UK REPS -
APRIL 3, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING THE VISIT OF SENATORS HUMPHREY,
HOLLINGS, MORGAN AND WILLIAM SCOTT TO VIENNA ON APRIL 3, 1975,
THE SENATORS HAD SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF
US DEL; SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY; AND WITH
ACTING UK REP GOODALL, FRG REP BEHREND, AND NETHERLANDS
REP DE VOS. THE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST ARE REPORTED
BELOW. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00164 01 OF 02 090915Z

2. IN DISCUSSION WITH US DELEGATION, FOLLOWING BRIEFING BY US REP, THE SENATORS COMMENTED ON A NUMBER OF MBFR RELATED TOPICS. SEN. SCOTT ASKED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING UNILATERALLY WITHDRAWN US FORCES WITH BUNDESWEHR TROOPS, NOTING FRG PROSPERITY AND DETERRENT EFFECTS ON SOVIETS OF POSSIBLE GERMAN BUILDUP. SEN. SCOTT ALSO EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM AS TO WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD ENTER INTO MBFR AGREEMENT IN GOOD FAITH, SAYING THAT RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO DECEIVE US IN SALT VERIFICATION. SEN. HUMPHREY VOICED CONCERN AT STRESS PLACED BY SOVIETS ON WEST GERMAN DANGER. HUMPHREY STATED THAT SUBCEILING ON FRG FORCES COULD BE CONTRARY TO US INTERESTS BECAUSE FRG WAS THE NATO ALLY MOST LIKELY TO MAKE WHATEVER EFFORT WHICH ADEQUATE SECURITY REQUIRED.

3. SEN. HOLLINGS ASKED ABOUT EASTERN TACNUC INVENTORIES AND OPINED THAT WEST HAD SURPLUS OF TACNUCS IN EUROPE. SEN. HUMPHREY NOTED POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF TANK/TACNUC TRADE-OFF.

4. ON STATUS OF TALKS, SEN. SCOTT NOTED THAT LACK OF SENIOR MILITARY REP ON SOVIET DEL INDICATED POSSIBLE RUSSIAN DISINTEREST. SCOTT FAVORED MUTUAL RATHER THAN UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS, BUT SAID THE SENATE HAD WAITED A LONG TIME FOR MBFR RESULTS. SEN. HOLLINGS PRESSED US REPS ON PROSPECTS FOR MBFR AGREEMENT BY APRIL 1976. HOLLINGS SAID MANSFIELD AMENDMENT MIGHT PASS SENATE IF VOTED ON TODAY. SEN. HUMPHREY THOUGHT MANSFIELD MIGHT WELL PROPOSE A CUT OF 100,000 IN US OVERSEAS FORCES (WORLDWIDE) TO BE SPREAD OVER THREE YEARS. HUMPHREY SAID THIS WOULD BE A DIFFICULT MEASURE TO OPPOSE AND THOUGHT CONGRESS MIGHT LEGISLATE A 50,000 MAN CUT. SEN. MORGAN SAID HE MIGHT VOTE TO CUT OVERALL SIZE OF ARMY, BUT COULD SEE LITTLE POINT IN SIMPLY BRINGING WITHDRAWN TROOPS TO US, AS THAT WOULD SAVE NO MONEY.

5. IN CODEL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS, KHLESTOV GAVE A STANDARD PRESENTATION OF SOVIET POSITION, STRESSING NEED FOR ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00164 01 OF 02 090915Z

ASSUME FROM THE OUTSET OBLIGATIONS REGARDING AMOUNT AND TIMING OF REDUCTIONS. SOVIET REPS ALSO PUSHED HARD FOR REDUCTIONS OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. WHEN SENATOR MORGAN ASKED HOW A UNILATERAL US WITHDRAWAL WOULD AFFECT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, SOVIET REPS FAVORED MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, NOTING POSSIBILITY OF FRG INCREASES THAT WOULD COMPLICATE SITUATION, BUT SOVIET REPS WERE ALSO CAREFUL NOT TO OPPOSE UNILATERAL US WITHDRAWALS. WHEN

ASKED BY SENATOR HUMPHREY WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD REACT TO UNILATERAL US CUTS WITH REDUCTIONS COMPARABLE IN NUMBERS AND IN TERMS OF SIZE OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA, KHLESTOV WAS EVASIVE. HUMPHREY MADE THE POINT THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS ONLY MEANT REDEPLOYMENT WHILE FRG CUTS MEANT REDUCING TOTAL SIZE OF FORCES. HUMPHREY ALSO STRESSED NEED TO REDUCE GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES. KHLESTOV REPLIED BY STRESSING THAT ALL FORCES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

6. SEN. SCOTT TOLD SOVIET REPS HE PERSONALLY DID NOT TRUST SOVIET UNION. HE SAID DETENTE SO FAR HAD MEANT GIVING RUSSIANS WHAT THEY WANTED, WITH NO GAIN FOR US. SCOTT SAID HE MIGHT WELL VOTE TO REDUCE US FORCES UNILATERALLY, BUT WOULD EXPECT SUCH WITHDRAWN US FORCES TO BE REPLACED BY FRG TROOPS. IN COURSE OF FURTHER REMARKS ON COMMUNIST WORLDWIDE THREAT, SCOTT SAID HE IN FACT INTENDED TO VOTE FOR EVERY MILITARY APPROPRIATION BILL WHICH CAME BEFORE THE SENATE.

7. SEN. HUMPHREY NOTED THAT VALADIVOSTOK TALKS HAD ESTABLISHED AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLE OF PARITY, WHICH ALSO WAS RELEVANT FOR MBFR. HUMPHREY POINTED OUT THAT EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON DATA WOULD BE HELPFUL.

8. DURING THEIR MEETING WITH BEHREND, GOODALL, AND DE VOS, IN REPLY TO CODEL QUESTION, FRG REP EXPLAINED THAT MAIN GERMAN CONCERNS RELATED TO SOVIET EFFORT TO CHANGE OR REDUCE POLITICAL STATUS OF FRG THROUGH DEMAND FOR NATIONAL CEILINGS AND POSSIBLE ELABORATE SYSTEM OF OBSERVATION POSTS. BEHREND SAID GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SO FAR WERE DISAPPOINTED WITH RESULTS OF DETENTE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00164 01 OF 02 090915Z

AND THAT ONLY BASIS FOR MBFR AGREEMENT WAS PARITY. SENATOR HOLLINGS REPLIED THAT NATIONAL CEILINGS WERE NON-NEGOTIABLE AND THAT SOVIETS WOULD MERELY WITHDRAW FORCES WHILE FRG FORCES WOULD BE ELIMINATED. HOLLINGS QUESTIONED VALUE OF MBFR TO FRG. FURTHER QUESTIONED BY HOLLINGS, FRG REP SAID BONN HAS INTEREST IN MBFR AGREEMENT BY 1978, BUT NO COMPELLING NEED FOR REDUCTIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00164 02 OF 02 090929Z

10

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 050704

R 090817Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0939

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0164

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

9. SEN SCOTT REASSERTED US COMMITMENT TO FRG SECURITY BUT REPROACHED WEST EUROPEANS FOR FAILING TO JOIN WORLD-WIDE STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM BY SENDING TROOPS ELSEWHERE, WHERE US FORCES WERE STATIONED, FOR EXAMPLE TO KOREA. HE NOTED POSSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL US REDUCTIONS. WHEN BEHRENDT SAID UNILATERAL CUTS COULD EITHER STIMULATE WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION OR ACCOMMODATION OF SOVIETS, SCOTT ASKED "WHY NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY INTERNAL AGREEMENT AMONG NATO POWERS?"

10. IN EXCHANGE WITH SENATOR MORGAN, ACTING UK REP GOODALL SAID UK WOULD VIEW WITH GREATEST DISMAY UNILATERAL US REDUCTIONS AS BRITAIN HAS MORTGAGED ENTIRE DEFENSE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00164 02 OF 02 090929Z

CAPABILITY TO NATO. MORGAN STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF

NATO, DESPITE CURRENT PROBLEMS IN TURKEY, GREECE AND PORTUGAL, AND SAID MBFR IS THE ANSWER TO MAINTAINING POLITICAL/MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

11. ON APRIL 4, US DEL SEPARATELY BRIEFED SENATORS LEAHY AND CULVER, WHO WERE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PREVIOUS DAY'S PROGRAM. THE MAIN INTEREST OF THESE SENATORS WAS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE SOVIETS WERE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND, IF SO, FOR WHAT REASONS. THESE QUESTIONS WERE ASKED IN THE CONTEXT OF ASCERTAINING WHETHER THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAD REAL PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS. THIS WAS ALSO MAIN FOCUS OF INTEREST OF SENATORS IN THE HUMPHREY CODEL. BELIEVE LATTER GROUP, THROUGH EXPOSURE TO SOVIET AND ALLIED REPS WERE IMPRESSED THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATION IS IN PROGRESS, ALTHOUGH AS NOTED, SOME DOUBTED THERE WOULD BE RESULTS WITHIN FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

12. DETAILED ACCOUNTS OF THESE MEETINGS HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY AIRGRAM.RESOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MBFRV00164
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750123-0149
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750467/aaaacjxy.tel
Line Count: 244
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 APR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <08 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: CODEL HUMPHREY/HOLLINGS DISCUSSIONS WITH US, SOVIET, FRG AND UK REPS -
TAGS: OREP, PARM, PFOR, US, NATO, MBFR, (HUMPHREY, HUBERT H), (SCOTT, WILLIAM),
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006